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BY WILLIAM BRATTON':' 
[ have two observations to make about Holocaust and related 
claims litigation and its relation to the subject of corporate social 
responsibility. JVIy perspective is that of a corporate law teacher. 
First poin t : large firms are making reparations because they c!o 
business on a global basis: despite this, many of the generating forces 
and events have operated at local levels in a manner inimical to 
globalist principles. 
Second point: these corporations can be required to make these 
reparations because their status as legal entities. which ordinarily 
serves to deflect responsibility, facilit::Hes inherited n:l�:;ability in a 
\VCIY th at does not obtain to human beings. 
V/ith these two points. this reparations movement reverses our 
usual expectations about multinational corporations ;.i.ncl !heir g!ob:ll 
operations. 
As to the first point. billions are being paid to Holor:aust cl<!ims 
bo:ncls and plaintiffs ,,vithout a single one of the \v(:ll-publici?.ed 
cluster of U.S. 1::-nvsuit:;; having been litigated to fin <! l judgrnent for the 
pL1intiffs. 
Why have all of these corporate defendants senled".' Should 'Xe 
infer that this is a spon taneous order result achieve d :n the globai 
vem:e--'1 triumph of international private ordering·) I>d the firms· 
,.dicn<li interest in reputation preservation. or. <llic:malivelv or 
cuncomitantiv. <111 imposition of shame on them by norm<itive 
e11lrepreneurs in this country and elsewhere. bring them to the 
:;t;ttlemenl table") Certainly. moral pressure. applied by private 
groups and government actors. and heightened by the international 
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media. matters here. 
But this is not just public shaming and private ordering. Law and 
legal entrepreneurs wielding sticks also show up in the sequence of 
events. And, significantly, they have done so for the most part at the 
state and local level in the United States. 
Consider the lawsuits filed in New York and California against 
the Swiss banks. These were defended in part on the ground that the 
Swiss government's claims settlement process was the more 
appropriate forum. Yet the banks settled here for $1.25 billion in 
August 1998. Why? Threats of sanctions, I daresay of dubious 
legality, made by elected officials in the state of New York brought 
the banks to the table, as did threats in the Senate banking 
committee, then run by another New York politician, Alfonse 
D'Amato. 
Not dissimilarly, the insurance claims moved from U.S. courts to 
the international settlement framework by way of an agreement 
among insurance commissioners from New York. California and 
Florida and six European insurers, one of \Vhich later wi t hdrew upon 
ceasing to do business in the United States. The German process for 
the compensation of slave laborers was initiated in 19Y9 with mention 
of proliferating litigation here and with the final settlement originally 
being contingent on dismissal of the U.S. lawsuits. In contrast. actual 
j udicial rulin gs implicating international law. which began coming 
down after 1998. have gone the defendants' way. 
This all suggests a standard public choice account of the claims 
movement. The critical impetus came from pressure gro ups and local 
politicians anxious to assist them in New York. Florida, and 
California. These actors worked in tandem. if not in partn,;rship. \vith 
actors from the plaintiffs bar. targetin g foreign firms lacking in local 
influence. ln state-level legal and political arenas. the interests of 
rluicl commerce in the global venue can count for litt le . In short. we 
have had a classic hold-up in the stream of cross-border commerce. 
with locals imposing themselves on foreign firms that ?.re made to 
bear the cost of the hold-up in order to access the value held out by 
doing business in the locality. In particular. the need ft;r access to 
New York as a world financial center seems to have figured centrally 
in the firms' vulnerability. 
Not that moral imperative has not operated also. In its absence, 
New York ' s interest in present i ng itself as <l hospitable venue for 
international capital might have reasserted itself so as to change the 
incentives of local politicians. And, absent a moral imperative with 
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negative and uncontrol labl e  reputational implications, a firm would 
be less quick to settle. 
But I wonder what the outcome would have been had the moral 
imperative operated alone, with no assist from lawyers and politicians 
wielding legal sticks at a barricade blocking a crossroad of global 
finance. I also wonder how much money would be on the table had 
al l outcomes depended exclusively on transnational and international 
law interpreted by judges or actors from the international law 
community. 
Expanding, here local and global interests have conflicted, with 
no Commerce Clause to force an outcome on the global side. Here 
the multinational firm goes abroad and gets slammed with l iability. 
where in the usual globalization story the multinational goes abroad 
to operate free of domestic regulatory constraints. That freedom 
implies irresponsibility, whether we are talking about Nike 
contracting to have sneakers manufactured by minors in Indonesia. 
an American industrial producing in Maquiladoras free of domestic 
wage levels and labor standards, or an American firm setting a 
transfer price with an Irish subsidiary so as to lighten its domestic 
corporate tax burden. 
II. Second Point 
Note that. given the peculiarities of the corporate form. such 
dubious corporate conduct tends to proceed without accountability 
on the part of any of the human actors who make the firm·s decisions. 
After all,  they do what they do to enhance shareholder value. 
referring us to their fidelity to the shareholder interest when we 
complain or negative social consequences. But. of course. they make 
that reference knowing well that we will be unable to fix 
responsibility on their shareholder beneficiaries because the juridical 
corporation intervenes to shield the shareholders with limited 
liabi!itv. More than that. with dispersed shareholcling there never 
emerges a human face to which moral responsibility meaningfully 
might be assigned. 1t diffuses in the collectivity. 
It follows that to fix a col lective responsibility we must take the 
firm as it comes-as a firm. This can be Jess than satisfactorv. \Nhen 
the firm commits a crime, for example, we cannot incarcerate its 
corporate personality. constructivel y  but meaningfully criminal 
though it may be. We can only fine it (and we may or may not find a 
culpable human agent for incarceration). Thus does corporate entity 
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status u:-;ually deflect responsibility. 
lVly second point is that entity status has the opposite effect with 
Holocaust claims. Recall that fifteen and twenty years ago. the 
American legal system sought corrective justice for the Holocaust by 
searching out and sending home direct participants who had come 
here after the war. By now such actors have passed from the scene. as 
have the cu lpable actors who ran Swiss banks. continental insurers. 
and German industrials during and after the War. Now our legal 
system seeks to compensate surviving victims (and in the case of 
many awards made in the Swiss bank claims process, the descendants 
and collaterals of deceased victims) while there is still time. A case 
for reparations certain ly could remain powerful after the surviving 
victims too are gone-as we see with arguments for reparations 
respecting Ame rican slavery. But it would be a case unsuited to the 
context of private litigation and dispute resolution . 
Meanwhile. unlike the responsible human beings. there is no 
danger that the corporate defendants will disappear. The basic 
attributes of corporateness-fictive legal personality. unlimited life. 
and successorship in the even t of merger or acquisition-keep 
corporate perpc:trators present and accountable. 
Not that questions cou ld not have been raised if some of the 
claims h<:�cl gone to full l itigation . The gravamen of many of the 
complain ts h<:1s been unjust enrichment. Given this. one legitimately 
can ask \Vll•.:.'ther Zl corporate defendant's end urance as a legal entity 
by itself imports responsibility. or whether a finding of present 
rcspom;ibility requires a show ing of institutional and owner�hip 
continuity. ·ro show unjust enrichment today. one would arguably 
have to show some tic between toclay·s economic entity and the War­
�=ra entity then look value from the victims. 
This manifestly aprH:ars to be the case with Swiss banks and 
Holocaust victim deposits . If. as seems likely. the institutional woricl 
of the Swiss bank is highly st<thle. roday·s banks rest on a capital bas� 
as to vvhich the victims· c.kposits are as much a pan as any capit<tl 
contributed prior to L950. As between survivors or re!atiYcs or 
victims ancl the b<mks' equity-holders. the former ought to have the 
benefit of that capital . 
The case is harder with the claim that the banks benefited from 
doing business with the Third Reich. acting as conduits for gold 
exchanged for capital which supported the war effort and otherwise 
acting as intermediaries in trade between the Reich and the outside 
world. Here there may or may not be an attributable unit of capital 
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depending on the financial particulars of those long-ago transactions. 
Institutional continuity also has been disputed in the case of the 
insurers, who raised postwar nationalizations in the East as defenses. 
Just what those nationalizations meant in financial terms is not 
immediately clear. Here the benefit conferred is the prewar flow of 
premiums. Such returns as originated in Eastern Europe may or may 
not have flowed upward to the home office of a company like 
Generali. If they did, and Generali otherwise has been a stable 
corporate institution. then a plausible case can be mack out. 
Compare a hypothetical case-one entirely a figment of my 
imagination constructed for the sake of argument. Suppose the 
policies in question were written by a Czech company wholly-owned 
by an Italian parent. It was operated as a separate entity and its 
policy proceeds were invested in a portfolio sited in Prague. After 
the War. what remained of the portfolio was subsumed into the 
nationalized Czech economy. What is the benefit conf,::rrecl on 
today "s Italian parent? The best one can do is look to intercorporate 
dividend flows prior to nationalization and draw inferences. 
Assume we find such a benefit flowing from Pragu,� to italy and 
spin the hypothetical out another step. Now assume that tllc Jt;:llian 
insurer was closely held by a family and that the family cashed out in 
1948 by selling 100 percent of their stock to ano th e r  Italian in:;urer. 
The insurer becomes the purchasing comp�llly"s wholly-owned 
subsidiary. But whither the benefit of the antt:cecient premium flO\\S') 
The surviving firm can argue that. despite the corporate continuity. 
the benefit recloundecl to the selling human equity-holders in 19-J.S. 
The same point obtains if its equity is publicly tr<:tclcc!. Dispersed 
stockholdings turn over as the years pass. Onc�� they do S(J 
completely. the ownership tie to the tonfcasor firm �1rguably 
disappears. There is institutional continuity. but when the question is 
benef it conferred. an economic institution \vhose uwnershifJ does not 
turn over. like a university or a state::. m�d�cs �'< mure :tttr(lctiv,; 
clc:fcndant a half century later. 
So which is it-the nominal entity or the ccunomic :;ub:stcmcc·) If 
l were deciding m;ltters of la\v in a H oloca u s t  claim::; cc:�se respecting 
slave labor or insurance policies (the Swiss bank depos its would be 
easy). 1 would be inclined to discredit arguments <dong the fcr�going 
lines and let liabilitv follow from entitv continuitv. The theorv is . . . 
simple: Corporations Ztncl corporate �Ktors. having taken the 
aclvm1tage of entity status Ztnd legal personality <1Cnh; the ·.::ntirc 
pt:riocl. should now also be held to take the detriments l)f entity :�tatl'.S 
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and reified. perpetual personality. I do admit that there might be an 
extreme case where I would make an exception-where through 
reorganizations, mergers, asset strips or whatever, the surviving firm 
really only had a nominal connection with the culpable institution. 
But my presumption of liability would be quite hard to rebut. 
